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Abstract: This paper draws on extensive island examples with a view to offer ‘creative’ solutions to the
ongoing dispute over the Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands between China (and Taiwan) and Japan in the East
China Sea. In spite of the rhetoric and apparent intractability of island conflicts, there are various examples from
the past (and the present) that suggest how island disputes may be decided, and in ‘win–win’ ways, to the
satisfaction of the different parties involved. The resolution of island territorial problems can benefit greatly from a
critical appreciation of how other small islands, also contested, have had their situation resolved in non-zero-sumways.
In such cases, sovereignty has been shared, split/divided or expunged; in other cases, sovereignty disputes have been
put aside in order to co-develop and co-exploit natural resources. There is also one example of a UNESCO World
Heritage Site consisting of a string of small islands and surrounding waters whose management is shared between three
countries.
Keywords: China, Diaoyu, Diaoyutai, East China Sea, Japan, Senkaku
Introduction
‘[E]ven though no one uses the islands currently
for anything, if WorldWar III takes place anytime
soon, this is where it will start – implausible as
that may sound’ (Posner, 2014).
The front cover of The Economist maga-
zine of 22–29 September 2012 showed a
clutch of very small rocky and uninhabited
islets, with a collective land area of less than
10 km2. But, in complete disproportion to
their insigniﬁcant size, the caption suggested
that China and Japan may ‘really go to war
over these’.
This set of islands is located in the East China
Sea, between China and Japan. They are unin-
habited, currently notionally administered by
Japan, which calls the islands Senkaku, but they
are also claimed by China (and Taiwan), by
whom they are called Diaoyu dao (which
actually means a ﬁshing platform and is the
name given to the largest island in the group)
and Diaoyutai respectively.
Why indeed should a few rocky ‘ﬁshing
platforms’ stir such serious passions and lead
to such dangerous confrontations, which
could also spark regional, possibly even
global, conﬂict? How could regional powers,
who are also neighbours and important trad-
ing partners, squabble over such seemingly
minor issues? Can ‘cold politics’ coincide
with ‘hot economics’ (Koo, 2009)? And why
are island disputes especially difﬁcult to
resolve?
In this position paper, I ﬁrst review some of
the main reasons explaining the stand-off be-
tween Beijing/Taipei and Tokyo over the
Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. Second, I il-
lustrate how various other small islands
throughout history have ended up in a similar
predicament, often being sucked into – and
ending up being devastated by – regional con-
ﬂicts, with the contending powers not necessar-
ily interested in the islands per se, but what they
portend, strategically and psychologically.
Third, I argue that island disputes today are es-
pecially emotional, poignant and obdurate be-
cause islands (i) come across as unitary and
indivisible entities; (ii) offer what may, at face
value, come across as easy opportunities for
the consolidation of state rhetoric about
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territoriality, often couched in expressions of
nationalism, control, territorial integrity and
identity; and (iii) lock lucrative and signiﬁcant
marine and sub-seabed resources. Fourth and
ﬁnally, I explain how, in spite of the rhetoric
and apparent intractability of island conﬂicts,
there are examples from the past (and the pres-
ent) that suggest how island disputes may be de-
cided, to some satisfaction of the different
parties involved. Thus, I argue, the resolution
of island territorial problems can beneﬁt greatly
from a critical appreciation of how other small
islands, also contested, have had their situation
resolved in non-zero-sum ways. This paper
forms part of a more extensive book project
(Baldacchino and collaborators, 2016).
Stage setting
Japan incorporated the islands as terra nullius
(vacant territory) and has been continuously ‘ad-
ministering’ the islands since then. It was after
some hesitation that the Japanese central gov-
ernment annexed the islands in January 1895,
after emerging victorious from the First Sino-
Japanese War, and ratiﬁed by the signing of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895 which,
however, refers to the cessation of ‘the island
of Formosa, and islands appertaining or
belonging to said island of Formosa [modern
day Taiwan]’ but did not mention the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The islands were
then used by Koga Tatsushiro and other
Japanese entrepreneurs to collect albatross
feathers and marine products; habitation on
the islands was also provided for workers
who were employed in a ﬁsh processing
plant.
Taiwan was returned to China at the end of
World War II in 1945, based upon the 1943
Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam
Proclamation. Japan accepted the terms of the
Cairo Declaration to the effect that ‘Japan shall
be stripped of … all the territories Japan has
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria,
Formosa and the Pescadores, [which] shall be
restored to China’ (Cairo Declaration, 1943).
In the Potsdam Proclamation, the signatories
afﬁrmed (Article 8) that the terms of the Cairo
Declaration would be carried out and limited
Japanese sovereignty to its four major islands
– effectively the Japanese mainland – and to
‘such minor islands as we determine’
(Potsdam Declaration, 1945). The victorious
Allied Powers did not speciﬁcally mention
the disposition of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
in the territorial clause of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty. However, they did decide,
under Article 3, to place ‘Nansei Shoto’ (the
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito islands) under
US administration. Article 2(b) of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty – which, by the way,
was not signed, and never accepted, by
China – simply states that ‘Japan renounces
all right, title and claim to Formosa and Pes-
cadores’ (San Francisco Peace Treaty, 1951).
Now, whether Nansei Shoto does include
the small Diaoyu/Senkakus may have been
assumed, but the island group was not
explicitly mentioned anywhere in the treaty
(Hara, 2006).
It was not until Christmas Day 1953 that with
US Civil Administration Proclamation No. 27 an
explicit reference (with precise geographical
coordinates) to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands
was made as part of the territory under US
administration as well as part of the Ryukyu
island chain (Lee, 2002). The USA administered
the islands as part of the US Civil Administration
of the Ryukyu Islands for almost three decades
after 1945 – during which time some of the
islands were used as targets for US bombing
practice (Eldridge, 2014) – and until 1972, when
the islands returned to Japanese control under
the Okinawa Reversion Agreement between
the USA and Japan. Japan regards, since 1896,
the islands as a part of the city of Ishigaki in
Okinawa Prefecture (Miyoshi, 2014). The
ofﬁcial position of the Japanese government is
that there is no registered dispute over the islands’
effective control which, by the way, also went
unchallenged by China for a long time (from
1895 to 1970).
China, meanwhile, argues that the Diaoyu/
Senkaku have been frequented by Chinese
ﬁshers and navigators from at least the 13th
century, used by them as orientation points
on their sea voyages between China and
Okinawa/Japan, and included in Chinese maps
as Chinese territory since at least the 12th
century. Moreover, they were annexed by
Japan via the Treaty of Shimonoseki by virtue
of being part of Taiwan province. Thus, as a
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result of Japan’s acceptance of the Cairo (1943)
and Potsdam (1945) Declarations, the Diaoyu,
as islands appertaining to Taiwan, should have
reverted to China along with Taiwan. Their inclu-
sion into the US Civil Administration of the
Ryukyus (1945–1972) was illegal from China’s
point of view, but was not then formally protested
because of the civil war underway in China at
the time.
In any case, the strategic location of the
islands is clear: their legitimate possession could
extend the exclusive economic zone of China/
Taiwan or Japan. The islands are probably also sit-
ting on signiﬁcant oil and gas deposits (Lavelle
and Smith, 2012). Indeed, China (and Taiwan)
began making explicit territorial claims to the
islands after the Committee for Coordination of
Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in
Asia Offshore Areas (an intergovernmental or-
ganisation created under the auspices of the
UN Commission for Asia and the Paciﬁc)
conducted research in the East China Sea in
1968 and reported that its seabed was likely
to contain rich deposits of oil (Emery et al.,
1969, 41).
While the state-driven rhetoric on both sides
presents a uniﬁed national façade, both coun-
tries have internal divisions to contend with
(Hara, 2006). In China’s case, Taiwan presents
a complex variable. Taipei has been advancing
a more conciliatory rhetoric and practice with
regards its relations with Japan, to the extent that
an agreement over shared ﬁshing rights in
Diaoyu/Senkaku waters has been concluded.
(Japan of course may have its own reasons to
seek conciliation with Taiwan in order to split
the Chinese position.)
On Japan’s side, the wild card may be the
prefecture of Okinawa from which the
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are currently adminis-
tered. These islands have had a strained history
with Tokyo that carries overtones of neo-
colonialism. Moreover, the islands were
detached from the rest of Japan in the aftermath
of the Second World War and were signiﬁ-
cantly militarised by the occupying US forces;
the military presence continues in spite of the
‘return’ of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. The
USA is an interested party in the security of
the East China Sea; its military resources in
Okinawa may be brought into action should
any China-Japan dispute escalate: something
that Japan may wish to keep in mind as a form
of reassurance; but which both China and the
USA would like to avoid. Interestingly, when
the seat of the Kingdom of the Ryukyus,
Okinawa, was an independent territory that
enjoyed an alliance with China that lasted
500 years (until 1879), vestiges of this historic
link with China – and some suspicion of Tokyo –
may yet prove useful in any eventual resolution
of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute (Yamaguchi and
Arakawa, 2002).
Small islands and a tense existence in history
We are living at a time where many states expe-
rience, or claim to experience, threats to their
cohesion and political integrity. Large states
with sprawling geographies and heavily popu-
lated communities, possibly also split along
multiple ethnic and racial lines, seek to balance
these centrifugal forces with federative arrange-
ments, granting some level of devolution and/or
self-determination to stave off demands for seces-
sion or to bring together previously self-governing
territories: Brazil, Canada, India, Nigeria, Russia
and the USA are good examples. In other, largely
continental, states, similar expressions of local
identity exist, but these are organised around dis-
tinct island afﬁliations and sympathies, often bred
out of a speciﬁc historical and/or (post)colonial
experience, that also nurture a ‘love–hate’ rela-
tionship with the respective mainland: Sicily and
Sardinia (Italy), Corsica (France), Jeju (Korea), Ha-
wai’i (USA) and Macau and (part-island) Hong
Kong (China) are suitable examples. In four coun-
tries – Japan, the UK, Indonesia and the Philip-
pines – the world’s only large and heavily
populated archipelagic states – these forces are
combined, to varying degrees. The 2014 Scottish
independence referendum, the separatist move-
ment in Mindanao (Podder, 2012) and tensions
in Irian Jaya (May et al., 2013) are keen reminders
of this centrifugal tension, expressed in different
ways: some peacefully, some more violently.
Nor is this tense existence for small islands a
recent historical phenomenon. In the island-rich
Caribbean, many of what are today small island
states changed hands in the context of regional
power politics between the 16th and 19th
centuries: for example St Lucia changed hands
between the French and the British no less
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than14 times. Even earlier, the islands of the
Mediterranean were already testimony to con-
siderable military operations, often involving
the military powers of Christendom versus
Islam, but also the crafty commercial interests
of city states like Genoa, Pisa and (most success-
fully) that island city state, Venice.
In many other cases, small islands are mere
pawns in a larger geo-strategic conﬂict: Think
Malta and ‘the Great Siege’ (1565); Midway,
Iwo Jima and Okinawa in the Paciﬁc Theater
of the Second World War (1943–1945); Kinmen,
and the Battle of Guningtou (1949); and Cuba
and the US-USSR ‘missile crisis’ (1962). They
are not seen as important acquisitions for their
own sake; rather, they are perceived as essential
platforms that help one party to secure its logis-
tic, resourcing and/or refueling challenges; or
to get its military materiel much closer to its
enemy’s heartland. Islands also become small
prizes that, however, can score important psy-
chological victories: Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher asked the British public to ‘rejoice’
when South Georgia was retaken by British
troops in the early stages of the Falklands War
(Dodds, 2013). Islands can also be construed
as tactical feints, meant to lure and distract; bat-
tlegrounds that force the enemy into pouring kit,
soldiers and other resources that are then
‘locked’ and cannot be used in other, more sig-
niﬁcant, theatres of war. Thus, Japan seized the
remote and sparsely inhabited islands of Attu
and Kiska, in the Aleutian Islands off Alaska,
in June 1942, a manoeuvre possibly designed
to divert US forces during Japan’s impending
attack on Midway Island in the central Paciﬁc
(Coyle, 2002).
Small islands can also serve as proxies (dummies
planted by third parties to forestall cooperation
among two regional players); they can serve as
pretexts (a ‘dress rehearsal’ for bolder and broader
territorial ambitions elsewhere (e.g. Weigand,
2011) and also bait (meant to test the resolve of
other parties towards action). For evidence of the
lingering value of islands in military strategy, note
that as of 2002, 29 out of 59 countries where the
USA had a military base were either on islands,
or took up entire islands (Foster, 2006).
Moreover, small islands suggest quick and
total military operations: once an enemy force
has reached a small island, the usual outcome
is eventual capitulation of the local garrison
(Royle, 2001). Indeed, it was also not uncom-
mon for complete island populations to be
dragged into slavery (Baldacchino, 2015). Even
as late as 1798, the island of San Pietro, south
of Sardinia, Italy, was ransacked by a surprise
pirate raid and all 920 survivors, mainly women
and children, were taken away and sold as
slaves in Tripoli (Zachs, 2005). In the modern
age, complete island populations have been
forcibly removed in the name of strategic
military interests, as in the early 1970s from
Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory, a
decision that continues being contested in the
courts (Vine, 2011). Other evictions occurred
in the name of science and nuclear arms testing,
as in the case of 1946 from Bikini atoll, Marshall
Islands (DeLoughrey, 2013); these islands
remain toxic and ‘unliveable’ (The Guardian,
2014).
Islands as dynamic arenas of political
transformation and economic value
Various islands ﬁnd themselves similarly placed:
sitting uncomfortably at the cross-hairs of com-
peting regional powers, through no fault of their
own. In an atlas of 123 ‘geo-political hotspots’,
Anderson (2000) identiﬁes 21 cases that involve
islands, in whole or in part. A typical situation is
for an island or a group of islands to be adminis-
tered and governed by one country, but is then
claimed by some other neighbouring country
(or countries). Again, typical of these situations
is that the whole island, or a whole archipelago,
is the subject of dispute: it is as if having only
one jurisdiction on and for an island is a natural
occurrence. Indeed, while there are thousands
of inhabited islands in the world today, only 10
are divided between more than one country:
Cyprus, Ireland and Usedom/Unznan in Europe;
Hispaniola and St Martin/ Sint Maarten in the
Caribbean; Tierra del Fuego in South America;
Boris Ussuriyski/ Heixiazi shared by Russia/
China, and Borneo/Sebatik, Timor and New
Guinea, all three cases involving Indonesia
(Baldacchino, 2013). Moreover, the situation in
some of these is not totally settled, stable or har-
monious: 3 of these 10 cases – Cyprus, Ireland
and Timor – are included amongst Anderson’s
21 cases as geopolitical island hotspots. Thus,
apart from these few exceptions, small islands
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have inspired ‘dreams of total knowledge’ and ‘de-
lusions of comprehensive totality’ (Macfarlane,
2012, 111) – serving as convenient microcosms of
the wider world – as much as delusions of
absolute, indivisible and total control. In fact
as much as in ﬁction, small islands have a habit
of breeding despots (Baldacchino, 2012; Law-
rence, 1928/1986; Redﬁeld, 2000, 12). As Dyer
(2013 n.p.) has noted, an obvious solution
would be to divide any disputed territory
evenly. However,
The Japanese and the Chinese could [do it]:
no face lost, and everybody makes a proﬁt …
So why don’t they just do it? Maybe because
there are islands involved. Nobody has ever
gone to war over a slice of seabed. But actual
islands, sticking up out of the water, fall into
the category of ‘sacred national territory,
handed down from our forefathers’ over
which large quantities of blood can and must
be shed.
Meanwhile, ocean spaces are no longer
dismissed as ‘empty’ but have become ‘a dy-
namic arena of political transformation and
claims-making’ (e.g. Chalﬁn, 2015). Islands have
become and remain critical in maritime and terri-
torial disputes, particularly with regard to their ca-
pacity to generate maritime jurisdictional claims
for the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Inter-
national regimes like the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which both China
and Japan signed in 1996, 1996 have ‘vested oth-
erwise worthless islands with immense economic
value’ (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2009, 906). Suitable
examples include Heard and McDonald Islands
(Australia), Okinotorishima (Japan), the Hawaiian
Islands (USA), Clipperton (France) and JanMayen
(Norway) (e.g. Song, 2010). The regime of islands,
as provided in Article 121 of UNCLOS, remains
unclear – depending on circumstance, including
their ability to support habitation, islands may
theoretically have a full, partial or no effect on de-
terminations of entitlement to maritime areas –
and no authoritative ruling or consensus on its in-
terpretation has yet emerged (Schoﬁeld and
Wang, 2012). This has various states scrambling
to strengthen their claims that offshore islands
are theirs and can indeed sustain human life.
The huge swathes of ocean that such claims
may harness for island and coastal states is con-
siderable: this would be prized for ﬁshing and/
or the existence of mineral deposits under the
seabed.
Islands that lie ‘at the edge’, geographically
and politically, as much as psychologically, of
imagined national or imperial boundaries, are
also bound to excite nationalist passions (Davis,
2015). Strident discourse from state agencies,
possibly fanned and supported by populist
media, can very easily craft a narrative that
speaks of such islands – and any inhabitants –
as integral to the very soul of the people/nation
and its identity. (Ironically, such expressions –
notably, British Prime Minister Thatcher’s calling
the Falkland Islanders ‘kith and kin’ (Dodds,
1998) – often ﬂy in the face of the actual policy
record, which may be best characterised by
long periods of ofﬁcial lethargy and neglect.)
Sentiments of territoriality can ﬁnd expression
in outward displays of emotion and affect, not
just in public demonstrations of loyalty and pa-
triotism but also in just-as-manifest spectacles
of antagonism to the viliﬁed out-group: the party
that is seen to be threatening the integrity of the
nation. These highly charged episodes can lead
to symbolic (such as efﬁgy or ﬂag burning) or
physical violence (such as vandalising property,
beatings and lynch mobs, but also state-
sanctioned armed conﬂict). They can bolster
the popularity of incumbent politicians and gov-
ernments, but risk getting out of control; nor are
the scars of such conﬂicts easily forgotten. A
suitable example of such a dispute concerns
the Falkland Islands (to Britain) or the Malvinas
(to Argentina): her resolute defence of a com-
mon island people following the Argentine inva-
sion of the islands in 1982 helped lead British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to electoral
victory in June 1983 (Clarke et al., 1990).
Creative alternatives: beyond the ‘Zero-Sum’
solution
But on some issues, it is impossible for both
sides to win. China’s territorial disputes, for ex-
ample with the possible exception of the one
with India, which is big enough to allow room
for a conceivable compromise, are zero-sum
(The Economist, 2014; my emphasis).
One must be wary and critical of dangerously
dogmatic assertions – such as the one previously
mentioned – that dismiss creative solutions, or
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that implicitly expect solutions to reside only in
large tracts of contested land space. Indeed,
history is well endowed with examples of
islands – large and small, populated and unin-
habited and single and archipelagic – that have
been at the brunt of territorial disputes and
which have seen them resolved not in ‘winner-
takes-all’ ways. Here are real-world examples
that defy the zero-sum approach, listed here in
historical sequence:
• St Martin (France)/Sint Maarten (The Neth-
erlands) – co-habiting a divided island –
since 1648 (Hillebrink, 2013). This is the
world’s smallest shared and inhabited is-
land jurisdiction.
• A condominium with alternating
governance: Pheasant Island (Spanish: Isla
de los Faisanes, French: Île des Faisans,
Basque: Konpantzia) is an uninhabited 2-
acre islet on the Bidassoa river and the
Franco-Spanish border. The island is under
joint sovereignty of Spain and France, each
of which control the island for alternating pe-
riods of six months – since the Treaty of the
Pyrenees (1659) (Kliot and Newman, 2013,
270).
• Heligoland for Zanzibar – a case of swap-
ping one island unit for another, as agreed
between Germany and Britain to resolve
colonial squabbles in Africa, since 1890
(Drower, 2002).
• New Hebrides – a Condominium (co-/paral-
lel governance by Britain and France) from
1906 to independence as the Republic of
Vanuatu in 1980 (Rawlings, 2012).
• Svalbard – Norwegian sovereignty, but
open territory for commercialisation to
treaty signatories since 1920 (Grydehøj
et al., 2012).
• Åland – a demilitarised autonomy, with
protected Swedish culture and language,
yet part of the sovereign state of Finland
since 1921 (Hepburn, 2014).
• The separation of the Ellice islands (now
Tuvalu) from the Gilbert Islands (now
Kiribati) in 1978, suggesting that even
small archipelagos with incredibly small
populations can be validly split (McIntyre,
2012).
• Antarctica – Special regime, a global com-
mons, governed by its own treaty – since
1959, and with all sovereignty claims tempo-
rarily suppressed (Dodds, 2011).
• Picton, Lennox and Nueva islands, with
mediation by the Pope: the islands and
3-mile territorial sea belong to Chile,
while oceanic rights are shared by both
Argentina and Chile, since 1984 (Guo,
2015).
• Shared jurisdiction – as with Ellis Island,
USA – ﬁrst landfall in North America for
millions of migrants – between the (sub-
national) states of New York and New
Jersey (since 1998), this proving to be a
practical solution when the US Supreme
Court found that the original island
belonged to New York but the reclaimed
land on the island belonged to New
Jersey (Mottola, 1999).
• Shared, joint exploitation of natural re-
sources, without compromising claims to
sovereignty (Valencia, 2007) – and as is
the situation with the Timor Sea Treaty be-
tween Timor Leste and Australia over re-
sources in the Timor Gap – since 2002
(Schoﬁeld, 2007).
• Boris Ussuriiski/ Heixiazi – a 50–50 land di-
vision solution agreed to by Russia and
China to stabilise their contiguous border
along the Amur river, since 2004 (Iwashita,
2013).
• Transboundary protected areas as promoted
by the IUCN-World Conservation Union. A
few of these are marine-based and involve
islands, such as the Wadden Sea area, in
Northern Europe. This is also a UNESCO
World Heritage site since 2009; it comprises
a string of islands involving Germany and
the Netherlands, with Denmark also partic-
ipating (Shine, 1997).
• Divided jurisdiction, as has been recently
proposed for Hans Island/ Tartupaluk, an
uninhabited rocky outcrop with a land area
of 1.3 km2 (0.5 square miles), located in the
centre of the Kennedy Channel which
separates Ellesmere Island, Canada, from
Washington Land, in north-west Green-
land, a home rule territory that forms part
of the Kingdom of Denmark. Hans Island,
the only disputed land left in the entire
circumpolar Arctic, has been claimed by
both Greenland/Denmark and Canada
(National Post, 2012).
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Opportunities
In a statement made at the Japan–China Summit
Meeting (Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and Vice
Premier Deng Xiaoping) during negotiations on
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between
Japan and China in 1978, Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping made this statement:
There exist a variety of issues between our
two countries. For example, there is the is-
sue of what is called the Diaoyu in China,
and the Senkaku Islands in Japan. There is
no need to raise subjects like this at a
meeting like this. As I expressed to Foreign
Minister Sonoda in Beijing, there is proba-
bly insufﬁcient wisdom to resolve the issue
in our generation, but with the next gener-
ation likely to be savvier than us, they will
probably be able to ﬁnd some resolution to
the issue. It is essential to look at this issue
with a broad perspective (1978, October
25) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,
2014).
Is the ‘wisdom’ hoped for by Vice-Premier
Deng now available? Or is 21st century diplo-
macy as, or more, liable to patriotic pursuits
and nationalist vitriol than that of the 20th
century?
It has been suggested that the cool-headed
decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to
shelve contentious issues (such as Japan’s war-
time record and the question of sovereignty over
the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Islands) appears to have
been overturned of late (Choong, 2014). A clear
escalation has been noted since the Japanese
Government went ahead with the purchase of
three (hitherto leased) islands within the
Diaoyu/Senkaku group in September 2012, in-
volving protests, violent actions and a boycott
of economic products. China announced the
introduction of new air trafﬁc restrictions in
November 2013, by creating the East China
Sea Air Defense Identiﬁcation Zone (ADIZ) cov-
ering most of the East China Sea. The move has
been interpreted as an attempt by China to pres-
sure Japan into acknowledging that there is a
dispute between Tokyo and Beijing over owner-
ship of the Diaoyu/Senkaku chain (BBC, 2013).
Meanwhile, the Abe Government in Japan, via
its Foreign Ministry, is of late displaying a map
of the country that proclaims its ‘inherent
territory’ – (Koyū no ryōdo) – going
blatantly beyond its currently internationally
recognised borders: the map incorporates three
sets of islands (the Senkaku amongst them,
along with Takeshima and the South Kuriles)
that are claimed or occupied by neighbouring
countries: China, Korea, and Russia respectively
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014;
Dudden, 2015).
But, there are other initiatives that have
helped to dampen this ‘tit for tat’ escalation. Al-
ready in March 1969, Japan began protracted
negotiations with Taiwan and South Korea, lead-
ing to an agreement in principle in September
1970, to set up a joint development project in
the East China Sea (Drifte, 2008).
When meeting Suzuki Zenko, a member of
the lower house of the Japanese Diet from the
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party on 11 May
1979, China’s Vice-President Deng Xiaoping said
that consideration may be given to joint develop-
ment of the resources adjacent to the Diaoyu
Islandwithout touching upon the touchy question
of its territorial sovereignty. In June 1979, the
Chinese side formally proposed the concept of
joint development of resources adjacent to the
Diaoyu Island to the Japanese side through
diplomatic channels (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the PRC, 2014).
Of late, after a serious escalation phase,
China and Japan have sought to reduce the
tension over the islands, particularly when
confronted by urgent priorities to restore and
boost their mutual economic links and trade
(Perlez, 2014). Taiwan, for its part, has pro-
posed The East China Sea Peace Initiative
which, while reiterating (but side-stepping)
claims to sovereignty over the Diaoyutai/
Senkaku, augurs towards ‘shelving disputes,
pursuing peace and reciprocity and promoting
joint exploration and development’ (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, ROC, 2012). As part of this
initiative, the Taiwan Government has signed
a ﬁshing agreement with Japan that covers
the waters around the contested islands, which
currently fall within overlapping jurisdictional
claims (Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, 2013);
this is performed fully within the spirit of Para-
graph 3 of Article 74 of UNCLOS (1982). Can
such an agreement, and its spirit of pragmatism,
extend to other areas of joint exploration be-
tween these countries?
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Conclusion
Which strategies have worked, and which have
not? What tested protocols can be repeated?
What is the problem of looking at existing
disputes (which always seem to defy resolution)?
There are also the pros and cons of the status
quo, or non-dispute resolution. In this case, shelv-
ing the issue, even in the name of regional peace
and cooperation can be seen to work for China,
which continues to grow stronger militarily and
economically but also for Japan, which continues
to implicitly administer the disputed islands.
Islands have been ‘novelty sites’ in more ways
than one (Baldacchino, 2007): they have served
as laboratories for evolution, nurturing high
levels of endemism (Whittaker and Fernández-
Palacios, 2007); they have encouraged contem-
porary offshore pursuits (Palan, 2006), and other
examples of ‘creative governance’ (Baldacchino,
2010). Cannot this track record be better ac-
knowledged, and extended, to dispute resolu-
tion? Can the parties with interests in this issue
look beyond anticipated zero-sum solutions by
also looking beyond zero-sum cases, as can be
the outcome of international litigation, as in the
1928 Island of Palmas award (Stubbs, 2014)? An
International Nature and Wildlife Preserve for
the Diaoyu/Senkaku has been suggested as a
‘dream solution’ (Przystup and Saunders, 2013).
And, just as Okinawa’s future has been suggested
(by Prof. Sato Manabu) as an ‘open border
land’, the same may be suggested for the
Diaoyu/Senkaku group (McCormack and
Norimatsu, 2012, 219).
To close, this paper argues that a more careful
look at the circumstances and processes that
brought contending regional powers to an hon-
orable, even mutually advantageous, settlement
over other islands throughout recent history
would be one such timely and valid approach
with respect to the festering dispute in the East
China Sea. The task ahead may involve conﬁ-
dence and security building measures to at least
start considering these options.
Even those who recognize the importance of
transcending such logic in favor of condomin-
ium or shared sovereignty options, generally
hold that the issue can only be addressed at
the last stage of any negotiated process, if at
all (Drifte, 2014, n.p.).
In any case, as this paper has hinted, the sheer
minor scale and size of small (and especially unin-
habited) islands and archipelagos, and their often
lack of exploitable, land–based natural resources,
may create those very conditions conducive to
playful experimentation between contending
parties, leading to creative andworkable solutions.
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